The EU Court of Justice provides landmark guidance on no-poach agreements under competition law

On 30 April 2026, the EU Court of Justice delivered its much-awaited judgment in case C-133/24, CD Tondela and Others v Autoridade da Concorrência (Tondela). The ruling constitutes the latest chapter in the line of sports-related judgments following Superleague (C-333/21), Royal Antwerp (C-680/21), and FIFA (C-650/22), in which the Court examined the compatibility of rules adopted by international and national sports associations with EU competition law. Tondela adds a new dimension to this line of case-law. Unlike its predecessors, the case does not concern rules unilaterally imposed by a sporting governing body, but rather a horizontal agreement concluded directly between competing professional football clubs, in collaboration with the national sporting association, against the exceptional backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Background and the questions asked to the Court for a preliminary ruling

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Portuguese Professional Football League (LPFP) suspended the 2019/2020 season. In April 2020, the first division clubs, in collaboration with the LPFP, concluded an agreement under which no club would hire a player who unilaterally terminated his employment contract citing difficulties caused by the pandemic or by any exceptional decision arising from it. The following day, most second division clubs adhered to that agreement.

In May 2020, the Portuguese Competition Authority (AdC) imposed interim measures suspending the agreement. In April 2022, the AdC adopted a final decision finding that the agreement constituted a restriction of competition by object prohibited under article 101(1) TFEU and equivalent national competition law.

The LPFP and the clubs appealed before the Portuguese Competition, Regulation and Supervision Court (TCRS), which decided to refer three questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling seeking, in essence, to determine whether the prohibition laid down in article 101(1) TFEU applies to the no-poach agreement at issue, having regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court’s judgments in Wouters (C‑309/99) and Meca‑Medina (C‑519/04 P), and article 165 TFEU (first and second questions), and whether that agreement should be classified as a restriction of competition “by object” under that provision (third question).

By way of background, under the doctrines established in Wouters and Meca-Medina, certain forms of conduct pursuing legitimate public-interest objectives may, in specific circumstances, fall outside the scope of article 101(1) TFEU. Wouters concerned a prohibition on multidisciplinary partnerships between lawyers and accountants, while Meca-Medina related to international anti-doping rules and the sanctions imposed on athletes. Article 165 TFEU, for its part, grants the EU a supporting competence in the field of sport and expressly recognises the specific nature of sport, including its social and educational functions.

The Court’s approach to no-poach agreements under article 101 TFEU

The judgment develops a comprehensive analytical framework for assessing no-poach agreements, particularly in the sports sector and in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while preserving the TCRS’s margin of assessment to reach its own duly reasoned conclusions on the basis of the specific facts of the case, which appear to remain disputed, notably as regards the precise involvement of the LPFP and whether the requirements of proportionality are satisfied.

The Court started by reaffirming that professional sport constitutes an economic activity subject to EU law, and that only a limited category of rules adopted exclusively on non-economic grounds and relating purely to sport as such (such as rules on national team eligibility or athlete ranking criteria) falls outside the scope of EU competition rules.

Given the now settled premise in the case-law that restrictions of competition “by object” cannot benefit from the line of justification stemming from the Wouters and Meca-Medina judgments, the third preliminary question was examined first, followed by the joint assessment of the first and second questions referred.

• Do no-poach agreements constitute restrictions of competition by object under article 101(1) TFEU?

The Court began by recalling that the concept of an anticompetitive “object”, while not constituting an exception to the concept of an anticompetitive “effect”, must nevertheless be interpreted strictly. It covers only forms of coordination revealing a sufficient degree of harm to competition such that an assessment of their effects is unnecessary. While classic cartel arrangements (price fixing, output limitations, customer or market sharing) are the clearest examples, other agreements and decisions by associations of undertakings may also fall within that category.

It further underlined that classifying an agreement as a restriction by object requires a cumulative assessment of three elements: (i) its content; (ii) its economic and legal context; and (iii) its objectives. The intensity of the contextual analysis may vary depending on the nature of the coordination at issue. Where an agreement closely resembles a particularly harmful form of cartel conduct, the contextual inquiry may be more limited. In other situations, a broader assessment may be required, including consideration of the relevant regulatory and institutional framework. As regards the objectives pursued, it was recalled that the absence of a subjective anticompetitive intention is not decisive.

Applying that framework to the case at hand, the Court considered that the content of the no-poach agreement disclosed a manifest restriction of a key parameter of competition in professional football, namely clubs’ ability to recruit players employed by competing clubs. It observed that article 101(1) TFEU covers collusion not only concerning the goods or services marketed by undertakings, but also concerning the resources required to produce them. In that regard, no-poach agreements are comparable to horizontal arrangements involving the sharing of “sources of supply” within the meaning of article 101(1)(c) TFEU, insofar as they artificially partition the market for players. Moreover, such agreements restrict player mobility and bargaining power and may indirectly depress wages, even in the absence of any direct salary-fixing mechanism.

Turning to the economic and legal context, the Court identified as relevant the COVID-19 pandemic, the suspension of the 2019/2020 season, the uncertainty surrounding the completion of competitions and the expiry of player contracts, as well as the significant practical and financial pressures faced by clubs. It further recalled that football competitions are based on sporting merit, which presupposes both the integrity of the competition and a degree of stability in the composition of player rosters throughout a given season to ensure that the sporting strength of teams is not substantially altered during the competition. Absent stabilising measures, players whose contracts had expired or who had unilaterally terminated them could have moved freely between clubs, potentially distorting the integrity of the competition.

It nevertheless stressed that neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor article 165 TFEU gives rise to a blanket derogation from article 101(1) TFEU. Rather, the emergency context and the specific characteristics of sport constitute relevant elements to be considered in the assessment, without exempting the agreement from scrutiny under the competition rules. In that regard, the Court distinguished coordination between clubs from regulatory rules adopted by sporting associations. It observed that the conduct at issue appeared to have originated from the clubs themselves, rather than from the sporting association, and recalled that article 101(1) TFEU prohibits undertakings from substituting practical cooperation for the risks of competition. At the same time, it noted that the information in the file suggested that the initiative may have been supported, or even endorsed, by the association’s president.

As regards the objectives pursued, it observed that an agreement may simultaneously pursue aims that are beneficial and detrimental from a competition standpoint. In the present case, it accepted the TCRS’s assessment that the agreement pursued, on the one hand, an anticompetitive objective consisting in restricting competition in player recruitment and, on the other hand, a pro-competitive objective of stabilising rosters to enable the resumption of the competition under conditions preserving its integrity.

In the light of the above, the Court held that it is for the referring court to determine, in a precise and reasoned manner and in the light of all the relevant factual and legal elements, whether the agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to qualify as a restriction of competition by object.

• Absent a restriction of competition by object, in what circumstances may no-poach agreements fall outside article 101(1) TFEU?

If the TCRS were to find that the no-poach agreement at issue constitutes a restriction of competition by object, any possible exemption could arise only under article 101(3) TFEU. Absent such a finding, the Court turned to examine the circumstances in which such an agreement might fall outside the scope of the prohibition laid down in article 101(1) TFEU.

It recalled that not every agreement or decision by an association restricting the freedom of action of undertakings necessarily falls within the scope of article 101(1) TFEU. An agreement may escape the prohibition where, having regard to its economic and legal context: (i) it pursues legitimate public-interest objectives that are not inherently anticompetitive; (ii) the restrictive measures adopted are genuinely necessary for achieving those objectives; and (iii) the resulting restrictions on competition do not go beyond what is necessary, in particular by eliminating all competition. It is for the interested parties to demonstrate, by means of convincing arguments and evidence, that those conditions are satisfied.

The Court then clarified that, contrary to the submissions of the AdC and the Commission, that line of case-law applies to any form of coordination between an association of undertakings and its member undertakings, and not solely to conduct taking the form of rules capable of being characterized as a decision by an association of undertakings.

Regarding the existence of a legitimate public-interest objective in the case at hand, the Court recognised that ensuring the regularity and integrity of sporting competitions constitutes a legitimate objective in the field of sport. In football, that objective may in principle justify rules governing transfer periods and measures aimed at preserving a certain degree of stability in clubs’ player rosters during a competition.

As regards the requirements linked to proportionality, it recalled that it must be assessed whether the agreement at issue is suitable for achieving the legitimate objective pursued, whether no equally effective but less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether the resulting restrictions on competition remain proportionate, in the strict sense of the term, in particular by not eliminating all competition on the market concerned.

The Court held that it is for the referring court, which expressed doubts as to whether the agreement was necessary and proportionate, to carry out an in-depth examination of those three conditions.