Garrigues Digital_

As the DMA moves beyond its initial implementation, enforcement activity and the first EU court rulings are adding clarity on the application of the rules. Attention is now also turning to how the framework will respond to developments in artificial intelligence and cloud computing.

Nearly four years since entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Digital Markets Act /DMA, and three years since the first designations, it is time to take stock, just as the European Commission (the Commission) has in its April 2026 Report on the Review of the DMA.

The Commission’s report (which it is obliged to repeat every three years, per Article 53 DMA) was informed by a public consultation, and assesses whether the DMA has been successful in achieving its core objectives of enhancing contestability and fairness in digital markets in the EU. The report concludes that the DMA has already made a tangible and positive contribution to those objectives and remains “fit for purpose”, such that no revision is required at this stage. It also identified a need to further improve transparency and procedural efficiency in enforcement and the importance of assessing the DMA’s applicability to the newly emerging developments in relation to AI and cloud computing services. 

While the report reflects the Commission’s view of the DMA’s early success, this Garrigues Digital update further examines the current wave of enforcement action, explores the expected future direction of DMA enforcement and the broader implications of such development for gatekeepers and business users.

The DMA at a glance

The DMA aims to promote contestability and fairness in digital markets. To this end, it establishes a set of obligations and prohibitions applicable to digital platforms designated by the Commission as “gatekeepers” in respect of specified “core platform services” (CPS). CPS categories include online intermediation services, online search engines, online social networking services, operating systems, web browsers, video-sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communications services (i.e., messaging apps), virtual assistants, cloud computing services and online advertising services. 

Designation occurs where the Commission concludes that an undertaking satisfies the cumulative qualitative criteria of Article 3(1) DMA in respect of one or more CPSs, i.e., the undertaking in question: 

(i) has a significant impact on the internal market, 

(ii) provides a core platform service which is an important gateway for business users to reach end users, and 

(iii) enjoys an entrenched and durable market position. 

Article 3(2) DMA creates rebuttable quantitative presumptions that those three criteria in Article 3(1) DMA are met, relating to EU turnover, number of monthly active end users and yearly active business users, and the length of time that the gatekeeper has met those quantitative thresholds. So, if all quantitative thresholds are met, there is a presumption that the qualitative thresholds are also met, but the undertaking has the opportunity to try to convince the Commission otherwise. Conversely, even if the quantitative thresholds are not met, if the Commission concludes, after a market investigation, that the qualitative criteria are nevertheless satisfied on the facts, there will be a designation. To date, seven undertakings have been designated as gatekeepers for one or more CPSs: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Booking, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft, in respect of a total of 23 CPSs. 

The DMA contains a range of measures that apply to “gatekeeper” undertakings and their designated CPSs that are designed to foster contestability and fairness in digital markets, including obligations relating to interoperability, user choice, anti-steering, access to app distribution channels, and restrictions on the combination of personal data across services.

The first years of enforcement

The Commission opened its first non-compliance investigations in March 2024, targeting Apple’s App Store steering rules, Meta’s “Consent or Pay” advertising model, and Alphabet’s Google Play and Google Search practices. 

The Article 5(4) anti-steering obligation requires gatekeepers operating app stores to allow app developers to inform customers of alternative offers available outside the app store and to direct them to those offers free of charge. In April 2025, the Commission imposed a €500 million fine on Apple in relation to its App Store (appealed in July 2025) and, in July 2026, a €430 million fine on Google in relation to its Google Play Store. Based on public reporting, Google brought an action for annulment of this decision before the General Court in October 2026.

The Commission has also found DMA infringements concerning self-preferencing. Under Article 6(5) DMA, gatekeepers must not treat their own services more favourably in ranking than third-party services. In July 2026, the Commission fined Alphabet, Google’s holding company, €460 million for self-preferencing its own shopping, hotels, transport and sports results on Google Search, ordering Google to bring its Search self-preferencing to an end within 60 days. Based on public reporting, Google also brought an action for annulment of this decision before the General Court in October 2026.

The Article 5(2) DMA requirement that gatekeepers must obtain valid user consent before combining personal data across different services was of issue in the Commission’s decision against Meta. The Commission found that Meta’s “pay or consent” advertising model, under which users on Facebook and Instagram could either consent to personalised advertising or pay a subscription fee, failed to offer the less personalised, free-of-charge alternative that Article 5(2) requires, and in April 2025, fined Meta €200 million. Meta has subsequently appealed the decision. 

The Commission has also made use of specification proceedings under Article 8 DMA as a more targeted enforcement mechanism that allows it to prescribe specific measures a gatekeeper must take to effectively comply with various DMA obligations but without any finding of infringement. Specification decisions resemble commitment decisions under the EU antitrust rules, except, unlike antitrust commitment decisions, the Commission is able to impose specification decisions without the gatekeeper’s consent. In the early years of DMA enforcement, specification decisions have emerged as an important tool in the Commission’s enforcement toolkit, alongside infringement decisions.

In September 2024, the Commission launched two sets of specification proceedings against Apple in relation to the interoperability obligation under Article 6(7) DMA, eventually adopting two decisions in March 2025 requiring Apple to (i) provide developers and businesses with free and effective interoperability with hardware and software features controlled by its operating systems iOS and iPadOS, (ii) improve the transparency, predictability, timeliness and fairness of the interoperability request process for developers to request interoperability with existing OS features. More recently, in July 2026, the Commission adopted two specification decisions concerning Alphabet setting out (i) measures Alphabet must implement to effectively comply with its Article 6(11) DMA obligation to share anonymised Google Search data with third-party search engines on FRAND terms; and (ii) measures Alphabet must implement to open up the Android operating system so that alternative AI services can enjoy the same level of interoperability as Google’s own Gemini service. Like DMA infringement decisions, specification decisions may be appealed by the addressee, which, we understand, both Apple and Google have done. Based on public reporting, Google also filed an application for interim relief in relation to sharing its search data. 

The First EU Court Judgments

The EU courts have also played an important early role in interpreting the DMA provisions. The first DMA judgment was delivered in ByteDance v Commission (17 July 2024). The General Court dismissed ByteDance’s challenge to its designation as a gatekeeper in respect of TikTok. Regarding the possibility of the Commission to open a market investigation instead of designating at the notification stage, the General Court held that in order to justify such a closer examination by the Commission, the DMA requires an undertaking to demonstrate “with a high degree of plausibility” that the Article 3(2) gatekeeper presumptions are called into question. More generally, the General Court examined whether the Commission erred in law or made assessment errors that could affect the lawfulness of the designation. The Court upheld the Commission’s position that ByteDance’s high global market value, combined with TikTok’s large EU user base, sufficiently reflected significant impact on the internal market despite relatively low EU revenue. Bytedance has appealed the judgment to the Court of Justice.

More recently, in Meta Platforms v Commission (3 June 2026), the General Court held that Meta retained a legal interest in bringing an action for annulment in respect of the Commission’s original classification of Marketplace as a CPS forming an “important gateway” under the DMA, despite the fact that the Commission had already repealed that part of the original decision meaning that Meta was no longer designated for marketplace. The Court found that the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons relating to the justification for classifying Marketplace as an online intermediation service despite Meta’s changes of 31 July 2023. By contrast, the Court upheld the classification of Meta’s Messenger service as a standalone number-independent interpersonal communications service (NIICS), rejecting Meta’s argument that Messenger was merely Facebook’s chat functionality and therefore not a CPS in its own right. Meta has subsequently filed an appeal to the Court of Justice. 

In Apple v Commission (8 July 2026), the General Court dismissed Apple’s challenges to its designation as a gatekeeper in relation to the App Store. It upheld the Commission’s finding that there was no justification for treating each of Apple’s App Stores as distinct CPSs, contrary to Apple’s arguments. The Court also ruled inadmissible Apple’s challenge to the Commission’s classification of iMessage as a NIICS, i.e., its messenger service. While the Commission found that iMessage constituted a CPS, the Commission concluded that iMessage was not an important gateway for business users to reach end users, and therefore not subject to the DMA obligations. The General Court held that the classification alone did not produce binding legal effects or alter Apple’s legal position and therefore was not an appealable act. Apple would be able to raise the challenge in future proceedings should iMessage be designated as a gatekeeper CPS. The judgment is subject to appeal though Apple has stated that it will not do so.

In Opera Norway v Commission (2 September 2026), the first ever third party application for annulment under the DMA, the General Court dismissed Opera Norway’s challenge to the Commission’s decision not to designate Microsoft as a gatekeeper in relation to its Edge web browser. The judgment is particularly significant for third party rights to challenge Commission DMA decisions before EU Courts because Opera was granted standing to bring the application, despite the Commission’s opposition. In its reasoning, the General Court pointed to the lack of rights in the Commission procedure as a factor militating in favour of admissibility before the EU Courts. However, the Court upheld the Commission’s substantive finding that, at the time of the assessment in 2023/2024, Edge did not constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. The judgment is subject to appeal. Opera was represented in these proceedings by a team of Garrigues lawyers.

The road ahead

In its report, the Commission presents the first phase of DMA enforcement as an “excellent start”. It has shown itself willing to act, issuing infringement decisions and fines against Apple, Meta and Alphabet within less than two years of the substantive obligations becoming applicable, and deploying specification proceedings as a further instrument to give concrete effect to its obligations.

The DMA does not expressly address AI as a distinct category, i.e., there is no AI-specific CPS. The Report has nonetheless indicated that the Commission will treat developments in the AI sector as a matter of priority, monitoring the deployment of AI tools within designated core platform services for DMA compliance and further assessing whether some AI services may need to be designated under existing categories, such as virtual assistants. 

Similarly, the three market investigations into cloud computing services launched by the Commission in November 2025 signal clearly where the enforcement is heading next. Two investigations are assessing whether Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should be designated as gatekeepers under the DMA, and a parallel third investigation is examining whether the DMA’s existing framework can effectively address practices that may undermine competitiveness and fairness in the cloud computing markets. The two designation decisions are expected by November 2026, and the final report following the market investigation on the DMA’s application to cloud markets is expected by May 2027. 

The DMA has already made an impact on the regulatory landscape of the digital economy and looks set to do so in years to come.